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Abstract 
 
UK governments and the energy regulator have shown increasing 
concern about the health of competition in the residential energy 
market, following their pioneering deregulation at the end of the 
last century. We identify the effects of introducing the non-
discrimination clauses in 2009, a major regulatory intervention and 
the first since deregulation.  We explore the effect of this 
intervention on the price movements of the six major players, and 
find that the nature of competition in the industry has changed, 
with less effective rivalry between the regional incumbents and 
large regional competitors following the intervention; companies 
seem to have ‘retreated’ to their home regions, leaving a market 
where pricing behaviour resembles more closely a duopoly 
between British Gas and the regional incumbent. 
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1. Introduction and history 
2008 marked a change in the GB energy regulator’s attitude to the residential 
retail market. While it had previously pioneered and championed competition in 
this sector, it became increasingly concerned with the fairness of the competitive 
process, seeing the competition glass much more as half empty than half full.  
We explore the effect of this policy shift on the industry by identifying changes 
in the way that the major suppliers to the retail market have set their prices.  The 
debate continues to be driven by political and consumer concerns, and to be 
fuelled by political intervention, ranging from ex cathedra statements by the 
prime minister that he would ensure that everyone was on the cheapest tariff in 
the market (Cameron, 2012) to the promise of a seventeen month price freeze if 
the Labour party is elected in 2015 (Miliband, 2013), and counter moves from 
the government to remove taxes which fund energy efficiency measures from 
prices (Osborne, 2013). 
Until 1996, each residential consumer in Great Britain was served by two 
monopolists – a national gas supplier, British Gas4 (known as Scottish Gas in 
Scotland), and one of fourteen regional electricity suppliers. The retail energy 
markets were opened between 1996 and 1999, and each of these previous 
monopoly suppliers entered each others’ markets. At the same time electricity 
distribution networks were separated
5
 from retail operations (gas networks had 
been separated from gas retail through the creation of Centrica in 1997).  A 
process of consolidation through takeover and exit led by 2002 to the emergence 
of five major successors to the electricity incumbents, each previously the 
monopoly supplier in two or three regions, and British Gas. These firms 
dominated supply, with other entrants gaining less than 1% of the market over 
                                                          
4 Piped gas is not available in many rural areas, so around 17% of households do not use gas. 
5 The Utilities Act 2000 required the legal separation of retail and distribution businesses, and 
ownership separation has since followed in half the fourteen regions.  
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the next decade, and with no long term survivors amongst these entrants, who 
were taken over or exited the market. The regulator reduced barriers to entry 
after some years, and by early 2014 there were several new entrants, whose joint 
share of the market had grown to 5% (Ofgem, 2014), the largest for many years. 
Nevertheless supply continues to be dominated by the five previous electricity 
incumbents and the former gas incumbent, known collectively as the Big Six
6
. 
Analysis of energy prices from these firms at the time when the last price caps 
were removed from the retail sector
7
 in 2002 showed that while parts of the 
market were competitive, incumbent mark-ups remained, suggesting 
considerable consumer inertia; and price variations did not reflect differences in 
costs for consumers using prepayment (pay as you go) meters, indicating 
considerably less well developed competition in this sector (Salies and 
Waddams Price, 2004).  The removal of price caps on incumbent suppliers 
coincided with the end of a period of consolidation in the industry which 
culminated in the establishment of the Big Six.  In the three years following that 
consolidation the surviving companies chose price structures which effectively 
separated the market, with some offering tariffs particularly attractive for users 
of large quantities, and others offering tariffs which were better for users of 
small amounts of electricity (Davies et al., 2014). These appeared to evolve 
from the repeated interaction of the companies in the regional electricity and 
national gas markets rather than from any explicit collusion; they are consistent 
both with innovation in the market and as an effective way of softening “head-
on” competition between suppliers. The very rapid increase in wholesale energy 
costs after 2005 seems to have destabilised this tariff pattern. 
However one pattern which continued in these later years, and which resulted in 
substantial regulatory intervention, was the persistence of an ‘incumbent mark-
                                                          
6 These are British Gas, EdF Energy, E.On, RWE NPower, Iberdrola, Scottish and Southern Energy 
(SEE). 
7 Distribution and transmission prices remain regulated 
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up’ of around 10%, similar to those identified by Salies and Waddams Price 
(2004) when the price caps were removed in 2002. In its 2008 Energy Supply 
Probe, the regulator identified such price differences between regions as a 
symptom of competition concern and a major problem for fairness; they 
introduced a new license condition (25A, which we refer to as the non-
discrimination clause, or NDC), to prevent companies charging higher mark-ups 
to consumers in their home regions than in others
8
. The regulator pursued this 
policy on the grounds of fairness, and a concern that vulnerable consumers were 
more likely not to have switched, and so be paying higher prices (Ofgem, 2008), 
despite acknowledging potential damage to competition (Ofgem 2009). The 
regulator was also motivated by complaints from potential entrants from outside 
the industry that the heavy discounts offered by major players out of their home 
markets acted as a barrier to entry to smaller players without a home base where 
they could charge higher prices to recoup their costs.  Following representations 
from the Big Six, the large players were allowed to compete through special 
offers to attract new consumers, so long as these were temporary; as predicted
9
, 
such special offers resulted in a proliferation of tariffs, and concerns that 
consumers, particularly vulnerable groups, might not fully understand the 
temporary nature of those offers, which were generally replaced by higher 
‘default’ tariffs when they expired..   
The 2008 supply probe also introduced other measures to improve competition 
and remove barriers to switching, including an annual statement to prompt 
consumer awareness, tighter rules on mis-selling of energy and restrictions on 
how far companies could prevent switching by consumers in debt. However 
after accumulated evidence that the market had been damaged by the NDC 
                                                          
8 The regulator simultaneously implemented a European directive, requiring that differences in the 
terms and conditions offered in respect of different payment methods is cost reflective, in  license 
condition SLC 27.2A. While this is not the focus of our analysis, we comment briefly on its potential 
effect in the conclusions.  
9 See for example the evidence from Waddams (2009) to the Ofgem consultation. 
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(Hviid and Waddams Price, 2012; Littlechild, 2012) the regulator reversed its 
decision to renew the clauses in 2012, but announced continued vigilance in this 
regard and introduced a number of other constraints on tariffs to simplify 
choices for consumers.  
In this paper we examine the evolution of electricity price movements of one 
major tariff type between 2005 and 2013, focusing on the interaction between 
different firms in the market.  Energy expenditure almost doubled between 2005 
and 2013 (from about £250 to £450 a year in real terms
10
) and prices have 
recently become the focus of considerable political attention (Miliband, 2013; 
Cameron, 2012).  We find that the pattern by which firms set their prices 
changed at the time of the NDC, consistent with concerns that this intervention 
has adversely affected the nature of competition in the industry. This supply side 
change has been mirrored by falling consumer engagement in the market, with 
switching rates halving between their peak in 2008 and 2013 (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, 2014a
11
).  The next section presents descriptive 
statistics on price changes in the residential market and explains the data and 
their limitations. Section 3 uses causality tests to identify price leadership, and 
section 4 discusses the policy implications and concludes. 
2. Tariffs and data 
Since 2005, the level of retail energy prices has risen in real terms, but with 
some decreases as well as increases.  This rising trend in prices is shown in 
figure 1 for each of the main suppliers, using an unweighted average across all 
regions of the annual bill of a direct debit electricity consumer on the standard 
offline tariff (i.e. the main tariff published for that payment method, rather than 
                                                          
10 These prices are deflated using CPI and May 2005 as the base. 
11 Switching rates rose dramatically inn the fourth quarter of 2013, though not the the height 
achieved in 2008, but fell back again in the first quarter of 2014. 
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one attracting special conditions
12
), using a medium quantity of electricity
13
. At 
the end of December 2013, 55% of residential consumers paid by direct debit, of 
whom about 65% were on standard tariffs of the kind reported here (Department 
of Energy and Climate Change , 2014b). 
Figure 1: Annual electricity charges by ‘Big Six’  
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI
14
, 
average across regions) 
 
Data Source for all graphs and analysis: Consumer Focus Price Comparison 
Factsheets and authors’ calculations 
Each of these Big Six suppliers is similar in terms of turnover and structure, all 
with both generation and retail operations in electricity supply (though only 
British Gas is vertically integrated in gas). Of the 26.7 million domestic 
electricity accounts in December 2007, the market shares of the Big Six ranged 
from 12% (Scottish Power, incumbent in only two regions) to 19% (Scottish and 
Southern Energy, incumbent in three regions) and 22% (British Gas) (Ofgem, 
2008 p. 32). No small entrant survived throughout the period of analysis, and at 
                                                          
12 Special conditions might include fixed prices for a specified period, ‘green’ tariffs which claim 
environmental benefits or other special benefits or conditions, including potential exit fees. 
13 3,300kWh was defined by Ofgem as the annual consumption of a ‘typical’ household with a 
medium level of energy demand (Ofgem, 2011) 
14
 All the price figures are deflated using CPI (May 2005=100). 
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the time of the Energy Supply Probe in 2008, four such entrants shared less than 
0.3% of the market accounts, though their share had grown to 5% by 2014 
(Ofgem, 2014). 
Figure 2 shows these data grouped according to type of supplier in each region, 
namely incumbent (which varies between regions), cheapest and median offer 
from among the rest of the Big Five (i.e. other than the incumbent and British 
Gas) and British Gas. To distinguish between these companies and smaller firms 
who have entered the industry from outside, we label these large companies with 
regional electricity incumbency regions as ‘majorsaway’ when operating outside 
their home areas; and identify the best majoraway as the one which charges least 
for the medium consumption level on the standard offline direct debit tariff. The 
gap between the average incumbent and median majoraway bills before 2008 
illustrates the background to the regulator’s introduction of the NDC. The 
regulator had found that in the period leading up to 2008 suppliers had charged 
around ten per cent more in incumbent areas (where consumers stayed with it as 
default provider unless they switched provider) than in other areas (where the 
majoraway had to tempt consumers away from the incumbent provider in that 
region). Of course the identity of the cheapest (and median) majoraway varies 
both between regions and across time periods, and identifies the best challenge 
to the incumbent at any one time.  
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Figure 2a: Annual electricity charges by type of supplier 
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI, average 
across regions) 
 
 
Figure 2b: Annual electricity charges by type of supplier – Eastern Region 
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI) 
 
 
Figure 2a shows the convergence of prices following the imposition of the NDC 
in 2009, and these reductions in differentials are illustrated in more detail in 
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figures 3 to 5.  We see this pattern even more clearly in some individual regions, 
for example the Eastern region, shown in Figure 2b. Price differences between 
incumbent and the best priced majoraway started to fall in early 2009 and 
reached their lowest point, where they remained for the following two years, 
around April 2011 (figure 3). The difference between the charges of the 
incumbent and British Gas changed considerably over the period. After a period 
of relatively high prices, British Gas made significant price reductions in 2007 
to close the gap with incumbents, and by early 2008 its prices became more 
competitive for electricity than those of incumbents. The average incumbent-
British Gas price difference has stayed above zero and relatively flat since then 
(figure 4). The British Gas strategy is reflected in price differences between 
British Gas and the best majoraway (figure 5), with a decreased gap after the 
price cuts, and a further decrease in price differences after the imposition of the 
NDC (figure 5). 
Figure 3 Difference in annual electricity charges between incumbent and 
best majoraway  
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI, average 
across regions) 
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Figure 4 Difference in annual electricity charges between incumbent and 
British Gas  
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI, average 
across regions) 
 
 
Figure 5 Difference in annual electricity charges between British Gas and 
best majoraway 
Direct Debit  consumer using 3300kWh per annum (deflated using CPI, average 
across regions) 
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We explore the implications of these differences for competition in the retail 
market. Hviid and Waddams Price (2012) showed that because the ‘strong’ 
market of each of the major players (where they were traditional incumbents) 
coincided with the ‘weak’ markets of competitors (where they had no 
incumbency base), and British Gas took a national approach, the NDC was 
likely to lead each company to concentrate on its home markets and compete 
less aggressively in others, resulting in higher prices.  
The initial high level data presented above suggest that this is precisely what has 
happened. Price differentials between standard tariffs have indeed fallen; since 
companies were allowed to introduce special offers, these increased dramatically, 
enabling the companies to segment the market, and focus their competitive 
actions away from the standard tariffs. Switching rates have fallen, confirming 
widespread evidence (Ofgem, 2008, p.152, Giulietti et al., 2005, Flores and 
Waddams Price, 2013, Waddams Price et al., 2013) that potential price gains are 
the main drivers of consumer activity in the residential energy market. Published 
figures at an aggregate level, and monthly figures obtained from the regulator at 
regional level, show a dramatic fall in switching rates following the introduction 
of the non-discrimination clauses. If the other policies which the regulator 
introduced at the same time to remove barriers to switching were effective, these 
figures may understate the fall in switching due to the NDC alone. On the other 
hand, companies gradually withdrew from direct marketing from 2011 onwards, 
which itself is likely to have reduced switching rates.  
Because of the volatility of upstream costs, particularly wholesale energy prices, 
it is difficult to identify directly whether price differentials between incumbents 
and majorsaway narrowed because incumbent prices fell (as the regulator 
intended) or because majoraway prices rose as competitive constraints 
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weakened. However figures from the regulator on the profitability of the Big Six 
seem to indicate the latter, as profit margins rose from levels near zero when the 
clauses were introduced, to margins of just over £100 per consumer in 2013 
(Ofgem, 2013).  
In this paper we explore the changes in companies’ pricing behaviour which 
followed the introduction of the package of reforms arising from the 2008 
Energy Supply Probe and the NDC. We do this by analysing the pattern of 
prices amongst the Big Six companies for their ‘standard’ electricity customers 
(off line, of average quantities, and paying by direct debit, the payment method 
used by most consumers switching energy supplier).  These data are taken from 
price sheets published by Consumer Focus which show the main tariffs for the 
Big Six; while later information includes online tariffs, the earlier publications 
do not, so we restrict our analysis to offline tariffs
15
. Since the non-
discrimination tariffs provided incentives for companies to use special offers to 
compete (because these were not tied to prices charged in home markets), 
competition shifted somewhat to these non-standard tariffs, which are not 
published. To the extent that companies no longer expect to recruit new 
consumers through standard tariffs, our analysis will therefore overstate any 
dampening effect on competition; we return to this in our conclusions.  
  
                                                          
15 Online tariffs offer discounts to customers who agree to receive their bills electronically, rather 
than via paper and post. Arrangements range from simple viewing of bills online to requiring 
customers to submit meter readings online. In 2008 around 1.3 million GB customers used online 
tariffs, just under 5% of households.  
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3. Patterns of price changes and causality tests 
This section analyses differences in suppliers’ pricing behaviour; to explore the 
effect of the NDC, we divide the data into two subsamples, before and after the 
introduction of the clauses.  We omit the period from July 2008 to August 2009 
as a transition period, since discussions about the new conditions started around 
June 2008 and were already affecting differentials before the publication of the 
Probe in October 2008, though the NDC was not formally imposed until 
September 2009. 
3.1 Model Specification 
We examine the behaviour of the major players in each region and build on the 
predictions of Hviid and Waddams Price (2012) to form our hypothesis that 
majorsaway will compete less aggressively with the established incumbent out 
of their home regions after the imposition of the NDC than they did before. If 
the majorsaway were exerting competitive pressure on the incumbents before 
the NDC, we would expect to see a negative relationship between the price 
changes of the incumbent and those of the best priced majoraway, as the latter 
moderates its own price increases to gain customers, so imposing some 
constraint on the incumbent.  In contrast, if the introduction of the NDC 
weakened this constraint, the majorsaway would then take advantage of any 
increase in the  incumbent's price to raise their own tariffs out of region, which 
would allow them to raise prices in their home areas too.  By linking home and 
out of area prices, the NDC provides an incentive for majorsaway to raise their 
tariffs.  Thus instead of constraining their own price increases to attract 
additional consumers, which would result in a negative relationship between the 
price changes, the majorsaway would follow the incumbent's price increases, so 
the relationship between the price increases would cease to be negative, and 
might even become positive. To support our hypothesis we therefore seek 
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evidence that the relationship between the incumbent's and the best majoraway's 
price changes is negative before the non-discrimination clauses are imposed 
(reflecting some competitive constraint on the incumbent's price from the best 
majoraway) and becomes less negative after they are introduced.  
 This hypothesis leads us to examine the relationship between the price changes 
of the major players in each region, focusing on that between the incumbent and 
the best majoraway
16
, and taking account of other price changes and relevant 
factors. We use a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR
17
) model to identify 
patterns between price changes. An advantage of using the VAR model is that it 
treats all variables as endogenous, and does not require prior restrictions on the 
model.  We then use Granger causality tests
18
 to assess the statistical 
significance of how price movements by each of the players in the market help 
to predict the subsequent price changes of others.  
A standard VAR, written as        , is a model in which   variables are 
specified as linear functions of   of their own lags,  lags of the other      
variables, and additional exogenous variables  We specify a p-order VAR model 
of price changes introduced by the incumbent, British Gas and the best 
majoraway, with exogenous variables including seasonal dummies and a time 
trend as follows: 
   
    (1) 
                                                          
16 Since our analysis concerns the behaviour of the Big Six, who controlled 98% of the market 
during this period (100% of it for most of it) we omit other entrants from this analysis. The identity 
of the best majoraway in each region is likely to change from time to time, so this does not 
necessarily represent changes in prices offered by a single company, unlike price changes for British 
Gas and the incumbent.  
17 Strictly speaking, the model is a VARX model, since it includes exogenous variables (quarterly 
dummy variables and a time trend), but we use the more familiar VAR acronym in the text.  
18 A variable x is said to Granger-cause a variable y if, given the past values of y, past values of x are 
useful for predicting y. After fitting a VAR model (see the above) for each equation of each 
endogenous variable that is not the dependent variable in that equation, the test computes and reports 
Wald tests that the coefficients on all the lags of an endogenous variable are jointly zero. The null 
hypothesis is that each of the endogenous variables does not Granger-cause the dependent variable in 
that equation. 
p
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Where )',,( It
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t
M
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is a  vector, and 
I
t
B
t
M
t ppp  ,,
are the price changes of the best majoraway, British Gas and incumbent, 
respectively, in period  ; 
to  are matrices of the parameters to be estimated; 
is a vector of exogenous variables, namely quarterly dummy variables 
and a time trend; 
is a matrix of coefficients; 
is a vector of parameters (constants); 
and is assumed to be white noise. 
If the  are distributed with a zero mean,  vector process, and and  
are covariance stationary and are not correlated with the , consistent and 
efficient estimates of the   , the   and   are obtained via seemingly unrelated 
regression, yielding estimators that are asymptotically normally distributed. 
In the above VAR model, effectively we have 3 equations estimated, namely of 
the current price change of the best majoraway, incumbent and British Gas 
respectively, with the same regressors, i.e. the price changes of the same players 
and the same exogenous variables in each equation on the right hand side. 
To determine the selection of lag length (the value of  ), we use a sequence of 
log likelihood ratio (LR) tests using a maximum of four lags
19
. We also 
                                                          
19 For a given lag  , the LR test compares a VAR with   lags with one with     lags. The null 
hypothesis is that all the coefficients on the     lags of the endogenous variables are zero. To use 
this sequence of LR tests to select a lag order, we start by looking at the results of the test for the 
model with the most lags. The first test that rejects the null hypothesis is the lag order selected by 
this process (also see Lutkepohl, 2005 p.143–144 for more information on this procedure). We also 
do another set of LR tests post estimation which are reported in the appendix. 
13
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implement a Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation in the residuals 
of the VAR models (as presented by Johansen, 1995) to ensure that the 
disturbance is not auto-correlated. Test statistics are reported in the appendix. 
LM tests with a maximum of five lags are implemented that show no hint of 
model misspecification for all regions. Statistics for two lags are reported in the 
appendix. Note that before we estimate the VAR model, Dicky-Fuller unit root 
tests confirm that all price changes are stationary in each region.  Prior to the 
VAR model specification, we also conducted cointegration tests and do not find 
robust evidence of cointegration of the price series of the suppliers
20
 in the 
regions in each period.  
After fitting the VAR model, we conduct Granger causality tests to test the 
statistical significance of causality from one supplier’s price changes to another. 
For instance, It-p ®Mt  in columns 2 and 3 of tables 1 and 2 reports whether 
past price changes of the incumbent influence the current price changes of the 
best majoraway. 
Establishing that past price changes of the incumbent help to explain the current 
price changes of the majorsaway is not sufficient, in itself, to confirm a causal 
relationship between the price changes of the incumbent and those of the best 
majoraway. As noted above, one advantage of using VAR is that no formal 
theory is required for the formulation of the model. But this also means that by 
design the Granger causality tests are predicated on a model that may be missing 
intervening variables. In other words, the finding of a ‘causal’ effect might result 
from the omission of a variable that is correlated with both of the left-hand-side 
variables. For instance, to prove the causal relationship between incumbent and 
the best majoraway, we would also have to demonstrate that there were no other 
                                                          
20 Note that if prices are cointegrated between the suppliers, the VAR model may be mis-specified as 
it ignores a long-term adjustment term in the specification and only focuses on short-term 
adjustments. In the absence of co-integration, VAR specification is appropriate.  
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intervening explanations that would explain price movements of both the 
incumbent and the best majoraway. The methodology used here can only show 
that the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis. We demonstrate this in 
greater detail at the end of the next subsection. 
3.2 Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the VAR model and Granger causality tests in 
Period 1, before June 2008. The coefficients reported measure the effect of one 
set of price variations on the price changes being explored, while controlling for 
all other variables (including previous price changes by both the supplier itself 
and other actors in the market, a time trend and seasonal factors).  Columns 2, 4, 
6 and 8 show the coefficients of each of the equations, and columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 
the results of the corresponding Granger causality tests
21
.  Causalities of price 
changes which are not significant under the Granger causality tests are not 
reported
22
. In seven out of 14 regions, Granger causality tests (column 3) 
confirm that the best majoraway responded to the incumbent’s price changes in 
the two previous periods (column 2). In all these cases the best majoraway 
responded in the opposite direction to the incumbent’s price changes: as the 
incumbents accelerated their price increases (decreases) the best majorsaway 
moderated their price changes.  For instance, in the Midlands region, if the 
incumbent had added to its price increase by £100 in the previous periods, the 
best majoraway would typically have responded by reducing its price increase 
by around £23.50.   
The pricing responses of the best majoraway to incumbents can be interpreted as 
the following strategy. If the incumbent accelerates its price increases, the best 
majoraway will slow its price increases to attract the incumbent’s customers; 
                                                          
21 The coefficients of lagged price of best majoraway itself are not reported in the table. 
22 For full results and diagnostics please see the appendix. 
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whereas when an incumbent slows down its price increase (say after a price rise), 
the best majoraway will accelerate its price increase to raise more revenue from 
existing customers, and perhaps to give it more scope for undercutting the 
incumbent in the next round of incumbent price increases. This suggests that 
other majors were providing some constraint on incumbents’ charges, 
notwithstanding the incumbent mark-up. 
The effect of British Gas price changes on those of the best majoraway shows 
more positive coefficients (columns 4 and 5); in twelve of the regions, an 
acceleration in price changes by British Gas is associated with an acceleration in 
the price changes of the best majoraway (column 4), confirmed by Granger 
causality tests (column 5). British Gas price changes also had a positive effect 
on the incumbents’ price changes in nine of the 14 regions (column 6), again 
confirmed by Granger causality tests (column 7). However the influence of the 
incumbent’s price changes on British Gas is in the reverse direction in two 
regions (column 8).  These statistical results from the VAR model and Granger 
causality tests show evidence of price leadership by British Gas in this period, 
since the price changes of both the best majorsaway and of the incumbents 
tended to follow those of British Gas.  
The pattern of Granger causality between price changes shows a striking 
relationship with ownership of the incumbent in each region,. For example, the 
seven regions where the incumbent’s price changes have a negative influence on 
those of the best majoraway include all three regions where RWE Npower owns 
the incumbent, all three where E.On does so, and one of the three where SSE 
owns the traditional supplier. The two regions where the best majoraway’s 
prices are not influenced by British Gas are the other two of the three where the 
incumbent is SSE.  Such ownership patterns are also reflected in the influence 
on incumbents’ price changes themselves by British Gas. The five regions where 
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Granger causality tests find no evidence of causality comprise all those where 
EdF or Iberdrola owns the incumbent. The reverse direction of causality, where 
the incumbent’s price changes influenced those of British Gas, occurs only in 
two regions, in both of which the incumbent is SSE.  
Table 2 shows the results from the VAR model and Granger causality tests in 
Period 2, after September 2009, when the NDC was imposed. The negative 
response of the price changes of the best majoraway to those of the incumbent is 
seen in only one region, Southern, a region where this was not evident in period 
1.  In the three regions where the incumbent is owned by NPower there is no 
evidence that the best majoraway responds to the incumbent’s price changes, 
compared with a negative result in period 1; in the three regions where the 
incumbent is owned by E.On the relationship has gone from negative to positive; 
in the two regions where Iberdrola owns the incumbent the relationship has gone 
from insignificant to positive; and there are mixed changes in the regions where 
the incumbents are owned by EdF or SSE. However the general pattern is that 
the incumbents’ price changes now influence those of the best majorsaway in a 
more positive way (nine of the fourteen regions), indicating that the best 
majorsaway are imposing less of a constraint on the incumbents’ price changes 
than they were in period 1.  For instance, in the Manweb region, if the 
incumbent adds to its previous price increase by £100, the best majoraway will 
follow and add to its price increase by between £36 and £42.  Compared to the 
pricing behaviour in period 1, the change in the pricing pattern in period 2 
implies that majorsaway are showing signs of retreating to their incumbent 
regions to focus on the revenue of their own incumbent customers, rather than 
recruiting customers in non-incumbent regions.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis derived from the theoretical predictions 
(outlined above and in Hviid and Waddams Price, 2012). If the majorsaway had 
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continued with the pricing strategy displayed in period 1, the NDC clauses 
would require any constraint on price increases in suppliers’ non-incumbent 
areas to be matched by a similar deceleration of price increases in their 
incumbent regions.  The NDC thus deters the best majorsaway from exerting 
their previous constraint on regional incumbents. Since we have omitted the 
period when the price adjustments were implemented in response to the NDC, 
these results capture the mutual response of companies after the clause was 
imposed, rather than the process of compliance itself.  
Columns 4 and 5 of table 2 show that past price changes of British Gas continue 
to lead the current price changes of the best majorsaway in 11 of the 14 regions, 
but the exceptional regions have changed. After the NDC it is the three regions 
where the incumbent is owned by NPower which are the exception (rather than 
the two where the incumbent is owned by SSE). 
A major change between the two periods is in the way that price changes by 
British Gas and the incumbent influence each other.  After the non-
discrimination clause, column 6 in table 2 shows that price changes of the 
incumbent follow those of British Gas in five regions, with the statistical 
significance of the causality confirmed by Granger causality tests (column 7). 
Note that in the period before the NDC was introduced, the causality from 
British Gas to the incumbent is significant in nine regions (see table 1 column 6 
and 7). Column 8 in table 2 shows that price changes of British Gas follow those 
of the incumbent in five regions (confirmed by Granger causality tests, column 9 
in table 2), while in the period before the NDC was discussed, the causality was 
only significant in two regions, and in a negative direction, i.e. British Gas 
imposed some constraint on the incumbent in these regions. After the imposition 
of the clauses, in half the regions the coefficients are more positive, with no 
qualitative change in the other regions.  Again there is a strong ownership 
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pattern: the seven affected regions are all those where the incumbent is owned 
by E.On or Iberdrola, along with two of the three owned by SSE. Observation of 
British Gas prices shows that it continued to follow a national policy, so we 
would not expect its behaviour to moderate the competition softening effect of 
the NDC. We have no reason to believe that there has been any difference in 
cost changes between the major companies, and their national market shares by 
customer numbers have stayed remarkably stable over the period. Regional 
market shares are more difficult to obtain, except to note a fall in the average 
share of the incumbents from 50% in 2005 to 33% in 2013 (DECC, 2013). Most 
of this fall (to 36%) had occurred before the imposition of the NDC in 2009.  
To assess whether these differences in pricing pattern are due to the NDC, we 
changed the cut-off dates of the two periods arbitrarily. We re-estimated the 
VAR model for period 1 by moving the cut-off point twelve months later, to 
include the period when its imposition was widely anticipated (from Jan 2005 to 
Jun 2009), and find that the negative causality from the incumbent to best 
majoraway disappears across all regions (instead we find positive causality from 
the incumbent to the best majoraway for 5 regions (Manweb, London, Scottish 
Power, Seeboard, and SWEB). Similarly, if we re-estimate the VAR model for 
period 2 by moving the cut-off point 6 months before the NDC was discussed 
(i.e. the period from Jan 2008 to Apr 2013), we find less significant positive 
causality from incumbent to British Gas across the regions. Whether or not we 
observe a distinctive change in the causalities before and after the cut-off point 
in our VAR model is sensitive to the periods chosen, corroborating the 
hypothesis that suppliers are, indeed, responding to the NDC. 
However, as mentioned in section 3.1, to establish a causal relationship of price 
changes between incumbent and the best majoraway (both before and after the 
NDC) alternative reasons that could explain such movements in the price 
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changes of the incumbent and best majoraway need to be excluded. Table 3 
summarises our findings that the past best majoraway price changes do not add 
explanatory power to the incumbents’ price changes, after controlling for the 
past incumbent price changes in the incumbent equation in these regions. In 
other words, the explanation runs from the incumbent to the best majoraway in 
these regions, but not in the reverse direction.  This is true for all regions shown 
in table 1 and 2 except one (Yorkshire in period 1 and SWEB in period 2).  
Similarly, table 3 shows little evidence that price changes of the best 
majorsaway ‘Granger Cause’ those of British Gas in each region. The results in 
table 3 do not rule out the possibility that there might be another explanation of 
the movements of these price changes
23
, but our analysis provides strong 
supporting evidence for our hypothesis.  
4. Conclusion 
The analysis suggests that before the introduction of the NDC clause, the best 
majorsaway were broadly constraining regional incumbents’ price increases. 
However, after the clauses were imposed, the best majorsaway’s prices were 
much closer to those of the incumbent, so that if the incumbent accelerated its 
price increases, the best majoraway would follow, indicating that the constraint 
on incumbent price increases has weakened, with majorsaway based in other 
regions likely to be less aggressive outside their own home regions after the 
NDC.  The evidence suggests that British Gas was the price leader of both the 
best majoraway and the incumbent in the period before the NDC. After the NDC, 
while the best majorsaway continued to follow British Gas, price leadership by 
British Gas of the incumbent is less strong. In five out of fourteen regions, the 
incumbent is leading British Gas, and in another five British Gas is leading the 
incumbent.  The regional markets seem to become closer to duopolies between 
                                                          
23 Causality established in this way would require structural assumptions with underlying theory 
behind the formulation.  
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the regional incumbent and British Gas, as regional incumbents now focus more 
on their home regions.  
Although by design the VAR model does not allow us to establish causal 
relationships of price changes between the suppliers, it does enable workable 
estimates of some underlying relationships. The estimations show that there is a 
change before and after the NDC in how price changes of the best majoraway 
are explained by the past movements of price changes of the regional incumbent.  
The sensitivity of the results to the timing of the cut-off point around the 
introduction of the NDC suggests that this is indeed the underlying cause of the 
change. Whereas we recognise that there could be other intervening 
explanations that explain the movements of price changes of both incumbent 
and best majoraway, the change in the pattern before and after the NDC strongly 
supports the hypothesis that the introduction of the NDC has changed the nature 
of competition and strength of rivalry in the tariff analysed.  This is the main 
tariff used by dual fuel customers
24
, particularly those who are likely to switch 
supplier. But as predicted and, to some extent intended, the focus of competition 
moved after the NDC to the special offers which companies were allowed to 
introduce. Unfortunately the number and variety of these tariffs does not make 
them amenable to a simple analysis of the kind presented here. 
While we cannot analyse the special tariffs, we note three aspects of this 
diversion of competition. The first is the encouraging message that the 
companies introduced them at all, suggesting a continuing appetite to segment 
the market and compete for some consumers, despite the potentially comfortable 
life of retreat to incumbent regions which the NDC offered. The second is that at 
the end of the special offers, consumers who took no further action would 
default onto regular tariffs of the kind whose analysis we report, so they may 
                                                          
24 We have analysed electricity rather than dual fuel prices because these are the tariffs whose 
relative value is directly affected by the NDC, but we expect similar results from an analysis of dual 
fuel tariffs.  
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reflect long term consumer experience, even for those who took advantage of 
limited time special offers. The third is that both falling switching rates and 
rising profits after the NDC suggest that companies were indeed competing less 
aggressively in the ‘standard’ markets following their introduction. However we 
believe that other remedies introduced by Ofgem at the same time, including 
non-discrimination clauses related to payment method
25
, were likely to be 
procompetitive, so any dampening of competition is likely to flow from the 
NDC itself. 
The last few years have also seen a significant increase in the number of new 
entrants to the industry, and in their market share. This is no doubt in response 
to the increasing profit levels in the sector, and such fringe entry is quite 
consistent with (tacit) co-ordination among the major players. The presence of 
the new suppliers is also a tribute to Ofgem’s efforts to remove entry barriers, 
including some social and environmental obligations, though barriers to 
expansion remain
26
. Insofar as the large players reduce price levels in response 
to these new entrants, and are unable to recoup their additional costs from only 
one (inert) group of consumers because of non-discrimination requirements, 
their entry will benefit all consumers. 
Ofgem’s introduction of the NDC was primarily on equity grounds, to prevent 
companies from charging higher prices to inactive consumers in their home 
regions. While the differential between the standard tariffs levied in different 
regions has indeed fallen, the increasing profits indicate that this levelling is 
almost certainly at the expense of consumers out of region, rather than through 
lower prices to those sticky customers at home. Indeed the increase in profits by 
around £100 per consumer, compared with an average price differential before 
                                                          
25 The payment related non-discrimination clauses are more likely to be procompetitive because the 
suppliers would agree on their ‘strong’ markets (see Hviid and Waddams Price 2012). 
26 Environmental and social obligations are applied to companies with more than 250,000 consumers 
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the NDC of less than £30
27
, suggests that all consumers are probably paying 
higher prices as a result. So while equity may have improved, this is likely to 
have been at the ‘absolute’ expense of just those consumers whom the regulator 
sought to protect.   
In reviewing the remedies introduced after the 2008 supply probe (which 
included the NDC), and in response to the falling switching rates and large array 
of tariffs (partly generated by the NDC itself), at the end of 2013 the regulator 
implemented restrictions on the number of tariffs which each company could 
charge, in order to simplify consumer choice. These are another form of non-
discrimination clause, since they constrain the range of prices which companies 
can offer to potential consumers, though not between regions which was the 
focus of the NDC. The early consequences are, as one might expect, the 
withdrawal of many of the lowest priced offers, some of which had previously 
been taken up by vulnerable groups.  The effect of these new restrictions will 
depend on whether the companies’ appetite for competition which was revealed 
through their array of special offers will lead them to make good offers across 
the board, or whether they will follow the pattern illustrated in this paper of 
reducing rivalry and retreating to established markets. Pricing strategies are also 
affected by government intervention. The 2013-14 review of the market by the 
competition and regulatory authorities and referral to the Competition and 
Markets Authority in 2014 is a welcome opportunity to consider the market as a 
whole, including the likely long term effect on the competitive process of past 
and potential future interventions by regulators and politicians.  
 
                                                          
27 Figures from Ofgem (2013)  and calculated from Ofgem  (2008) 
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Table 1 Results for period 1 –before the non-discrimination clause (Jan 2005- Jun 2008) 
1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Region 
tpt MI   tpt
MB   tpt
IB   tpt
BI   
 VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test 
Eastern P=2: -
0.124 
8.18 
(0.02) 
P=2: 0.301 25.80 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.376 5.49 
(0.06) 
  
East 
Midlands 
P=2: -
0.112 
5.59 
(0.06) 
P=2: 0.350 32.24 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.396 6.89 
(0.03) 
  
London   P=2: 0.305 23.79 
(0.00) 
    
Manweb   P=1: 0.168 
P=2: 0.306 
16.41 
(0.00) 
    
Midlands P=1: -
0.235 
10.80 
(0.01) 
P=2: 0.335 30.15 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.428 
P=2: 0.322 
20.04 
(0.00) 
  
Northern P=1: -
0.212 
10.51 
(0.01) 
P=2: 0.302 32.77 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.323 
P=2: 0.349 
15.05 
(0.00) 
  
Norweb P=2: -
0.209 
14.95 
(0.00) 
P=2: 0.340 39.32 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.378 5.74 
(0.06) 
  
 
Table 1 Continued 
1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Region 
    
 VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test VAR 
coefficient 
GC test 
Scottish 
Hydro 
P=2: -
0.174 
6.72 
(0.08) 
P=1: 0.450 
P=2: 0.287 
79.76 
(0.00) 
P=2: 0.539 24.45 
(0.00) 
P=1: -
0.716 
13.42 
(0.00) 
Scottish 
Power 
  P=1: 0.144 
P=2: 0.245 
8.41 
(0.02) 
    
Seeboard   P=2: 0.177 8.25 
(0.02) 
    
Southern     P=2: 0.315 8.68 
(0.01) 
  
SWALEC     P=2: 0.276 13.56 
(0.00) 
P=2: -
0.609 
6.59 
(0.09) 
SWEB   P=2: 0.202 11.44 
(0.00) 
    
Yorkshire P=1: -
0.180 
6.03 
(0.05) 
P=2: 0.284 23.45 
(0.00) 
P=1: 0.370 
P=2: 0.432 
20.42 
(0.00) 
  
tpt MI  tpt MB  tpt IB  tpt BI 
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Column 2 reports the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of the incumbent in the best majoraway equation, 
i.e. how the price changes of the incumbent in the past affect current price changes of the best majoraway; 
Column 4 reports the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of British Gas in the best majoraway equation, 
i.e. how the price changes of British Gas in the past affect current price changes of the best majoraway;  
Column 6 reports the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of British Gas in the incumbent equation, i.e. how 
the price changes of British Gas in the past affect current price changes of the incumbent;  
Column 8 reports the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of the incumbent in the British Gas equation, i.e. 
how the price changes of incumbent in the past affect current price changes of British Gas;  
Columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 report the corresponding Granger Causality tests;  
Only significant coefficients of lagged price changes are reported in the table.  
The following list shows the incumbent owner in each region:  
 
Region Incumbent owner 
 
Eastern E.On 
East Midlands E.On 
London EdF 
Manweb Iberdrola 
Midlands NPower 
Northern NPower 
Norweb E.On 
Scottish Hydro SSE 
Scottish Power Iberdrola 
Seeboard EdF 
Southern SSE 
SWALEC SSE 
SWEB EdF 
Yorkshire NPower 
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Table 2 Results for period 2 after the non-discrimination clause (Sep 2009- Apr 2013)       
1 2 3 A 4 5 B 6 7 C 8 9 D 
Region 
tpt MI   
ch 
tpt MB   
ch 
tpt IB   
ch 
tpt BI   
ch 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 
Eastern P=3: 
0.196 
16.90 
(0.00) 
+ P=1: 
0.366 
P=3: 
0.284 
9.04 
(0.03) 
 P=3: 
0.624 
 
6.29 
(0.10) 
 P=3: 
0.319 
19.47 
(0.00) 
+ 
East 
Midlands 
P=3: 
0.252 
21.73 
(0.00) 
+ P=1: 
0.417 
P=3: 
0.276 
10.55 
(0.01) 
   - P=3: 
0.437 
22.79 
(0.00) 
+ 
London    P=2: 
0.324 
P=3: 
0.276 
12.87 
(0.01) 
 P=1: 
0.350 
P=3: 
0.422 
8.43 
(0.04) 
+    
Manweb P=1: 
0.421 
P=2: 
0.360 
24.60 
(0.00) 
+ P=3: 
0.364 
19.26 
(0.07) 
    P=1: 
0.808 
P=2: 
0.354 
P=3: 
0.321 
42.95 
(0.00) 
+ 
Midlands   +   -   -    
Northern   +   -   -    
Please see notes for table 1.  A B C D Qualitative changes between the periods 
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Table 2 Continued 
1 2 3 A 4 5 B 6 7 C 8 9 D 
Region  ch  ch  ch  ch 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 
Norweb P=3: 
0.209 
16.16 
(0.00) 
+ P=1: 
0.292 
P=3: 
0.163 
7.96 
(0.05) 
 P=3: 
0.672 
12.35 
(0.01) 
 P=3: 
0.421 
25.02 
(0.00) 
+ 
Scottish 
Hydro 
P=1: -
0.312 
P=2: -
0.311 
P=3: -
0.354 
14.28 
(0.00) 
 P=1: 
0.211) 
P=2: 
0.273 
P=3: 
0.541 
34.71 
(0.00) 
   -   + 
Scottish 
Power 
P=1: 
0.582 
P=2: 
0.430 
23.01 
(0.00) 
+ P=3: 
0.340 
15.28 
(0.00) 
    P=1: 
0.917 
P=2: 
0.474 
P=3: 
0.416 
28.41 
(0.00) 
+ 
Please see notes for table 1.  A B C D Qualitative changes between the periods 
 
Table 2 Continued 
1 2 3 A 4 5 B 6 7 C 8 9 D 
Region  ch  ch  ch  ch 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 VAR 
coeffic’t 
GC 
test 
 
Seeboard    P=2: 
0.269 
7.47 
(0.06) 
 P=1: 
0.589 
P=3: 
0.588 
25.69 
(0.00) 
+    
Southern P=1: -
0.176 
P=2: -
0.267 
12.90 
(0.01) 
- P=2: 
0.341 
P=3: 
0.534 
29.13 
(0.00) 
+   -    
tpt MI  tpt MB  tpt IB  tpt BI 
tpt MI  tpt MB  tpt IB  tpt BI 
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P=3: -
0.440 
SWALEC    P=3: 
0.450 
16.54 
(0.00) 
+   -   + 
SWEB P=2: 
0.297 
6.30 
(0.10) 
+ P=2: 
0.226 
 
7.51 
(0.06) 
 P=1:0.338 
P=3: 
0.444 
22.17 
(0.01) 
+    
Yorkshire   +   -   -    
Please see notes for table 1.  A B C D Qualitative changes between the periods 
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Table 3 Additional Tests of Granger causality from past price changes of best 
majoraway to current price changes of incumbent and British Gas 
Region Incumbent 
owner 
Period 1 Period 2 
tpt IM   tpt
BM   tpt IM   tpt
BM   
  GC test GC test GC test GC test 
Eastern E.On 1.14 (0.57) 2.80 (0.25) 1.84 (0.61) 3.17 (0.36) 
East 
Midlands 
E.On 0.86 (0.65) 3.07 (0.22) 1.90 (0.59) 2.85 (0.42) 
London EdF  6.17 (0.05)  1.77 (0.62) 
Manweb Iberdrola  4.38 (0.11) 1.58 (0.67) 3.44 (0.33) 
Midlands NPower 1.55 (0.46) 1.54 (0.47)  1.01 (0.80) 
Northern NPower 4.68 (0.10) 0.09 (0.96)  1.46 (0.69) 
 
Table 3 Continued 
Region Incumben
t 
owner 
Period 1 Period 2 
tpt IM   tpt
BM   tpt IM   tpt
BM   
  GC test GC test GC test GC test 
Norweb E.On 0.75 (0.69) 0.52 (0.77) 2.83 (0.42) 4.17 (0.24) 
Scottish 
Hydro 
SSE 1.28 (0.53) 0.28 (0.87) 1.69 (0.64) 0.81 (0.85) 
Scottish 
Power 
Iberdrola  3.75 (0.15) 6.21 (0.10) 9.26 (0.03) 
Seeboard EdF  0.63 (0.73)  1.61 (0.66) 
Southern SSE  0.22 (0.89) 1.06 (0.79) 1.76 (0.62) 
SWALE
C 
SSE  0.49 (0.78)  0.33 (0.96) 
SWEB EdF  0.24 (0.89) 10.37 (0.02) 1.01 (0.80) 
Yorkshire NPower 5.07 (0.08) 0.44 (0.80)  1.21 (0.75) 
GC test reports the Granger causality test statistics on the coefficients of price changes in 
the past (up to   lags) of the best majoraway in the incumbent/British Gas equation, i.e. 
how the price changes of the best majoraway in the past predict current price changes of 
incumbent/British Gas, controlling for past price changes of incumbent/British Gas itself, 
that of British Gas/incumbent and exogenous factors in the model.  
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Appendix: 
The following tables show the full results with the LM test (testing auto correlation in the residual terms) and LR test (testing 
lag length). 
Table A1-Part I: Results for period 1 –before the non-discrimination clause (Jan 2005- Jun 2008) 
Region 
tpt MI   tpt MB     
Eastern P=2: -0.124 (-1.58) P=2: 0.301***(4.64) P=1:  0.376***  (2.32)  
East Midlands P=2: -0.112 (-1.35) P=2: 0.350***(5.13) 
 
P=1: 0.396***(2.61)  
London P=1: -0.288* (-1.78) P=2: 0.305*** (4.84)   
Manweb  P=1: 0.168** (1.88) 
P=2: 0.306*** (3.91) 
  
Midlands P=1: -0.235*** (-3.12) P=2: 0.335*** (5.48) P=1: 0.428*** (4.11) 
P=2: 0.322*** (2.53) 
 
Northern P=1: -0.212*** (-3.03) P=2: 0.302*** (5.72) P=1: 0.323*** (2.95) 
P=2: 0.349*** (2.83) 
 
Norweb P=2: -0.209*** (-3.10) P=2: 0.340*** (6.01) P=1: 0.378*** (2.28)  
Scottish Hydro P=2: -0.174** (-2.00) P=1: 0.450*** (8.79) 
P=2: 0.287*** (3.31) 
P=2: 0.539*** (2.83) P=1: -0.716*** (-2.75) 
Scottish Power  P=1: 0.144* (1.65) 
P=2: 0.245*** (2.76) 
  
Seeboard  P=2: 0.177*** (2.87) P=2: 0.151* (1.64)  
Southern   P=2: 0.315*** (2.67) P=2: -0.488** (-1.94) 
SWALEC P=2: -0.234* (-1.70) P=2: 0.154* (1.82) P=2: 0.276*** (3.43) P=2: -0.609** (-2.10) 
SWEB  P=2: 0.202*** (3.35)   
Yorkshire P=1: -0.180** (-2.40) P=2: 0.284*** (4.82) P=1: 0.370*** (3.42) 
P=2: 0.432*** (3.23) 
 
 
  
tpt IB  tpt BI 
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Table A1-Part II: LM and LR tests 
Region LM test (chi2) LR test No. of Obs. R-sq 
Eastern P=1: 4.63 (0.86) 
P=2: 10.11 (0.34) 
P=2*: 33.60 (0.00) 
P=1: 19.76 (0.02) 
39 E-eq: 0.62 
I-eq:  0.32 
B-eq: 0.29 
East Midlands P=1: 5.49 (0.79) 
P=2: 9.11 (0.43) 
P=2*: 38.90 (0.00) 
P=1: 20.51 (0.02) 
39 E-eq: 0.62 
I-eq:  0.32 
B-eq: 0.22 
London P=1: 11.47 (0.24) 
P=2: 8.77 (0.46) 
P=2*: 26.77 (0.00) 
P=1: 9.27 (0.02) 
39 E-eq: 0.48 
I-eq:  0.28 
B-eq: 0.22 
Manweb P=1: 13.41 (0.14) 
P=2: 16.74 (0.06) 
P=2*: 20.55 (0.00) 
P=1: 32.64 (0.02) 
39 E-eq: 0.61 
I-eq:  0.44 
B-eq: 0.20 
Midlands P=1: 5.59 (0.78) 
P=2: 6.53 (0.69) 
P=2*: 32.76 (0.00) 
P=1: 18.42 (0.03) 
39 E-eq: 0.52 
I-eq:  0.44 
B-eq: 0.18 
Northern P=1: 9.75 (0.38) 
P=2: 3.77 (0.93) 
P=2*: 41.78 (0.00) 
P=1: 18.97 (0.03) 
39 E-eq: 0.50 
I-eq:  0.46 
B-eq: 0.16 
 
Table A1-Part II Continued 
Region LM test (chi2) LR test No. of Obs. R-sq 
Norweb P=1: 9.75 (0.38) 
P=2: 11.84 (0.22) 
P=2*: 45.35 (0.00) 
P=1: 17.66 (0.04) 
39 E-eq: 0.60 
I-eq:  0.27 
B-eq: 0.16 
Scottish Hydro P=1: 8.39 (0.49) 
P=2: 7.44 (0.59) 
P=3*: 26.32 (0.00) 
P=2: 31.41 (0.00) 
38 E-eq: 0.73 
I-eq:  0.63 
B-eq: 0.32 
Scottish Power P=1: 14.53 (0.11) 
P=2: 6.82 (0.66) 
P=2*: 23.88 (0.01) 
P=1: 6.75 (0.66) 
39 E-eq: 0.42 
I-eq:  0.21 
B-eq: 0.15 
Seeboard P=1: 5.38 (0.80) 
P=2: 4.14 (0.91) 
P=2*: 21.73 (0.01) 
P=1: 8.50 (0.49) 
39 E-eq: 0.31 
I-eq:  0.25 
B-eq: 0.07 
Southern P=1: 11.05 (0.27) 
P=2: 9.13 (0.43) 
P=2*: 28.30 (0.00) 
P=1: 2.52 (0.98) 
39 E-eq: 0.25 
I-eq:  0.44 
B-eq: 0.15 
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SWALEC P=1: 5.18 (0.82) 
P=2: 11.80 (0.23) 
P=3: 23.89 (0.00) 
P=2*: 13.93 (0.12) 
38 E-eq: 0.24 
I-eq:  0.54 
B-eq: 0.26 
SWEB P=1: 5.56 (0.78) 
P=2: 3.79 (0.92) 
P=2*: 16.72 (0.05) 
P=1: 6.63 (0.68) 
39 E-eq: 0.34 
I-eq:  0.24 
B-eq: 0.10 
Yorkshire P=1: 5.36 (0.80) 
P=2: 4.45 (0.88) 
P=2*: 25.67 (0.01) 
P=1: 23.78 (0.01) 
39 E-eq: 0.24 
I-eq:  0.54 
B-eq: 0.26 
Note: 
 A VAR model is a seemingly unrelated regression model with the same endogenous explanatory variables (  lags of price changes of best majoraway, 
incumbent and British Gas in our case) in each equation, i.e. the equation of price changes of best majoraway, incumbent and British Gas. 
 column report the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of incumbent in the best majoraway equation, i.e. how the 
price changes of incumbent in the past affect current price changes of best majoraway. T-statistics are reported in the brackets.  *** , ** and  * 
indicates statistical significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 column report the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of British Gas in the best majoraway equation, i.e. how the 
price changes of British Gas in the past affect current price changes of best majoraway. T-statistics are reported in the brackets. *** , ** and  * 
indicates statistical significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 column report the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of British Gas in the incumbent equation, i.e. how the price 
changes of British Gas in the past affect current price changes of incumbent. T-statistics are reported in the brackets. *** , ** and  * indicates statistical 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 column report the coefficients of price changes in the past (up to   lags) of incumbent in the British Gas equation, i.e. how the price 
changes of incumbent in the past affect current price changes of British Gas. T-statistics are reported in the brackets. *** , ** and  * indicates statistical 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Only significant coefficients of lagged price changes are reported in the table. 
 LM test column report P-values  of the test of autocorrelation in the residual and the null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation at lag    
 LR test column report the log likelihood ratio test post estimation, starting with the model with most lags. For a given lag  , the LR test compares a 
VAR with   lags with one with     lags., the null hypothesis is that all the coefficients on the     lags of the endogenous variables are zero. P-values 
are reported in brackets.* indicates the optimal lag length which is the number of lags selected for estimation except in region 12. In region 12, total 
number of 3 lags is used to ensure 0 auto-correlation in the disturbance term. 
 R-sq column report the R-sq of each equation. E-eq, I-eq and B-eq refer to the best majoraway equation, the incumbent equation and the British Gas 
equation. 
  
tpt MI 
tpt MB 
tpt IB 
tpt BI 
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Table A2-Part I: Results for period 2 –after the non-discrimination clause (Sep 2009- Apr 2013) 
Region 
tpt EI   tpt MB   tpt IB   tpt BI   
Eastern P=3: 0.196*** (4.00) P=1:  0.366*** (2.53) 
P=3: 0.284** (1.96) 
P=3:  0.624* (1.65) 
 
P=3: 0.319*** (4.40) 
East Midlands P=3: 0.252*** (4.58) P=1: 0.417*** (2.98) 
P=3: 0.276* (1.93) 
 P=3: 0.437*** (4.75) 
London  P=2: 0.324*** (2.81) 
P=3: 0.276** (2.07) 
P=1: 0.350** (2.17) 
P=3: 0.422** (2.52) 
 
Manweb P=1: 0.421*** (4.65) 
P=2: 0.360*** (2.86) 
P=3: 0.364*** (3.42)  P=1: 0.808*** (6.38) 
P=2: 0.354** (2.01) 
P=3: 0.321*** (1.98) 
Midlands  P=3: 0.325* (1.82)   
Northern     
Norweb P=3: 0.209*** (3.84) P=1: 0.292** (2.23) 
P=3: 0.163* (1.92) 
P=3: 0.672***(3.25) P=3: 0.421*** (4.98) 
 
Table A2-Part I Continued 
Region  tpt MB     
Scottish Hydro P=1: -0.312*** (-3.16) 
P=2: -0.311***(-2.59) 
P=3: -0.354*** (-2.93) 
P=1: 0.211**(1.97) 
P=2: 0.273***(2.54) 
P=3: 0.541*** (5.66) 
  
Scottish Power P=1: 0.582***(4.59) 
P=2: 0.430*** (2.79) 
 
P=3: 0.340*** (2.69) P=1: 0.331** (2.21) P=1: 0.917*** (5.11) 
P=2: 0.474** (2.16) 
P=3: 0.416** (2.22) 
Seeboard P=2: 0.290** (2.03) P=2: 0.269* (1.86) P=1: 0.589*** (4.00) 
P=3: 0.588*** (4.22) 
 
Southern P=1: -0.176*(-1.66) 
P=2: -0.267** (-2.09) 
P=3: -0.440*** (-3.56) 
P=2: 0.341*** (2.92) 
P=3: 0.534*** (5.01) 
  
SWALEC P=1: -0.252** (-2.00) 
P=2: -0.273* (-1.86) 
P=3: -0.262* (-1.78) 
P=3: 0.450*** (4.02)   
SWEB P=2: 0.297** (2.09) 
 
P=2: 0.226** (2.10) 
 
 
P=1: 0.338** (3.08) 
P=3: 0.444*** (4.26) 
 
Yorkshire     
tpt EI  tpt IB  tpt BI 
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Table A2-Part II: LM and LR tests 
Region LM test (chi2) LR test No. of Obs R-sq 
Eastern P=1: 14.05 (0.12) 
P=2: 12.01 (0.21) 
 
P=3*: 33.62 (0.00) 
P=2: 6.01 (0.74) 
44 E-eq: 0.44 
I-eq:  0.39 
B-eq: 0.38 
East Midlands P=1: 11.18 (0.26) 
P=2: 11.27 (0.26) 
P=3*: 36.91 (0.00) 
P=2: 8.44 (0.49) 
44 E-eq: 0.48 
I-eq:  0.34 
B-eq: 0.41 
London P=1: 8.75 (0.46) 
P=2: 6.21 (0.72) 
P=3*: 17.55 (0.04) 
P=2: 24.51 (0.00) 
44 E-eq: 0.37 
I-eq:  0.29 
B-eq: 0.17 
Manweb P=1: 10.91 (0.28) 
P=2: 2.58 (0.98) 
P=3*: 36.34 (0.00) 
P=2: 12.80 (0.17) 
44 E-eq: 0.54 
I-eq:  0.26 
B-eq: 0.54 
Midlands P=1: 3.63 (0.93) 
P=2: 4.78 (0.85) 
P=3*: 19.80 (0.02) 
P=2: 10.19 (0.34) 
44 E-eq: 0.17 
I-eq:  0.30 
B-eq: 0.15 
Northern P=1: 4.70 (0.86) 
P=2: 9.13 (0.43) 
P=3*: 29.65 (0.01) 
P=2: 11.21 (0.26) 
44 E-eq: 0.20 
I-eq:  0.33 
B-eq: 0.15 
Norweb P=1: 10.61 (0.30) 
P=2: 6.23 (0.72) 
P=3*: 40.40 (0.00) 
P=2: 6.42 (0.70) 
 
44 E-eq: 0.45 
I-eq:  0.38 
B-eq: 0.43 
 
Table A2-Part II Continued 
Region LM test (chi2) LR test No. of Obs R-sq 
Scottish Hydro P=1: 8.39 (0.50) 
P=2: 10.92 (0.28) 
P=3*: 38.79 (0.00) 
P=2: 7.10 (0.63) 
44 E-eq: 0.49 
I-eq:  0.31 
B-eq: 0.17 
Scottish Power P=1: 9.11 (0.43) 
P=2: 4.64 (0.86) 
P=3*: 27.01 (0.00) 
P=2: 18.39 (0.03) 
44 E-eq: 0.48 
I-eq:  0.39 
B-eq: 0.46 
Seeboard P=1: 7.40 (0.60) 
P=2: 4.58 (0.87) 
P=3*: 25.41 (0.00) 
P=2: 25.82 (0.00) 
44 E-eq: 0.34 
I-eq:  0.48 
B-eq: 0.14 
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Southern P=1: 8.11 (0.52) 
P=2: 10.72 (0.30) 
P=3*:  37.09 (0.11) 
P=2: 8.88 (0.49) 
44 E-eq: 0.45 
I-eq:  0.33 
B-eq: 0.22 
SWALEC P=1: 6.51 (0.69) 
P=2: 8.11 (0.52) 
P=3*: 26.57 (0.00) 
P=2: 7.84 (0.55) 
44 E-eq: 0.33 
I-eq:  0.31 
B-eq: 0.15 
SWEB P=1: 4.98 (0.84) 
P=2: 4.48 (0.88) 
P=3*: 24.44 (0.00) 
P=2: 19.64 (0.02) 
44 E-eq: 0.33 
I-eq:  0.45 
B-eq: 0.13 
Yorkshire P=1: 5.10 (0.82) 
P=2: 8.80 (0.46) 
P=3*: 25.72 (0.00) 
P=2: 9.81 (0.37) 
44 E-eq: 0.18 
I-eq:  0.31 
B-eq: 0.13 
 
